Inside Asian Gaming

IAG OCT 2020年10月 亞博匯 70 COLUMNISTS I nvestors seeking above-market returns through participation in integrated resort (IR) business ventures may need to recalibrate their return on investment (ROI) expectations on the heels of the COVID-19 pandemic. A combination of high barriers to entry along with restricted competition have previously allowed Asia’s casino industry to thrive. In the past 10 years, new major markets have emerged in both Singapore and the Philippines, while Macau’s Cotai Strip has witnessed nearly US$40 billion of overall IR investment. Historically, even smaller regional casino developments with questionable business plans could generate substantial profits such that a large number of under-qualified schemes were approved and funded. In general, most of the megaresorts in Macau and Singapore were underwritten with the expectation that they could generate annual returns greater than 20%, and in fact a majority of early projects did produce impressive cash flows with payback periods of less than five years. However, greater regional competition, an increasingly regulated and therefore waning VIP market coupled with reduced tourism volumes due to varying travel restrictions will likely cause future returns and payback periods to hover in the low double digits. These reduced returns and longer payback periods are normally unattractive to casino developers who are highly cognizant of obtaining licensing terms that are financeable by the capital markets. It is for this and other reasons that major global casino operators including Las Vegas Sands (LVS) and Wynn Resorts have abandoned the Japan market, citing its tough business environment, short license tenure and inflated projected capital costs. Yet, their respective investment hurdles are more than likely developed on a business plan resembling those that generated the outsized profits they yielded from realizing first-mover advantages in Macau – offering their then-unique casino gaming products to a newly opened and growing market. Most probably they used an investment framework based on those specific circumstances rather than adopting a model of perfect competition that is more broadly used in Las 那 些希望通過投資綜合度假村(IR)業務來獲得 高於市場平均回報的投資者，可能需要在新 冠肺炎大流行肆虐期間重新調整他們的投資 回報率(ROI)預期。 高市場進入門檻加上在競爭上的限制，曾經 讓亞洲的博彩業騰飛。在過去十年間，新的主要市場已經於新加 坡及菲律賓出現，澳門的路氹城就錄得總共近400億美元對IR的 投資。從歷史上看，即使是規模比較細而且業務計劃並不完善的 地區賭場發展項目，都能夠賺取可觀利潤，就如大量低質素的企 劃亦得到許可並成功籌集資金。 一般而言，大部分在澳門及新加坡的超級度假村都被認為可 於每年產生高於20%的回報。大部分早期的開發計劃事實上都可 以帶來亮眼的現金流，而且回本期更可短於五年。可是由於區域 競爭日益激烈，還有因為監管逐漸收緊而出現衰退的貴賓市場， 加上不同的旅遊限制引起的旅客數字下跌，都很可能導致未來的 回報率及回本期在低兩位數的空間徘徊。 一些娛樂場開發商很清楚要以資本市場可以接受及融資的 條件去獲得牌照，但回報的減少及更長的回本期正常都會降低對 它們的吸引力。這就是包括拉斯維加斯金沙及永利渡假村在內的 環球主要娛樂場營運商放棄日本市場的眾多原因之一。他們都指 出了當地艱難的商業環境、較短的牌照期限和龐大的預計資本要 求。 可是它們之所以遭遇到各自的投資障礙，可能都是由於它們 的商業計劃是建基於那些為他們帶來超額利潤、讓他們在澳門享 有開荒牛優勢的方案。作為這個當時新興和正在增長的市場，澳 門讓這些營運商把當時獨特的娛樂場博彩產品帶到其中。更有可 能的是，他們現時用了一個基於從前那例外情況的投資框架，而 不是一個在拉斯維加斯這種商業競爭比較激烈的地方會被採用、 把完全競爭計算在內的模式。 那麼，放棄日本是否一個明智之舉呢？在我看來，這就要視