Inside Asian Gaming

IAG OCT 2020年10月 亞博匯 49 焦點關注 Prior to the implementation of the table cap in 2012, there was essentially no limit to the number of tables an operator would provide their junket partners. The general attitude at the time was the more the merrier. The table cap changed all of that, forcing operators to make sure they were getting the most bang for their buck from the limited number of tables in their possession. And it has been VIP that has felt the pinch. To understand why, imagine a scenario in which a baccarat table in a typical Macau junket room is generating daily roll of US$3.5 million. At the theoretical win rate of 2.85%, that’s a win of around US$100,000 per day. However, taking into account the 10% EBITDA profit margin for operators in Macau’s VIP segment, daily operator EBITDA for a table rolling US$3.5 million is just US$10,000. Compare that to a mass table that wins US$50,000 per day but generates operator EBITDA of US$20,000 due to its much higher 40% margin. That’s double the EBITDA of a VIP table at half the win, and a much more attractive proposition for any operator. It was with this in mind that operators first introduced minimum monthly roll requirements. “It was a way to mitigate the fact that some junkets, back in the old days before there was a table cap, used to consume 10, 15 or 20 tables in a room and now because of the table cap, every table is precious,” says Tash, who was SVP of Gaming Operation & Strategy for Melco-Crown when the table cap was introduced. “Mass needed those tables back, so this was a means of cracking down on underperforming junkets. “The opportunity cost of VIP tables varies by casino. Some casinos may achieve higher returns by removing some or all tables from underperforming junkets, and either converting them to better-margin mass tables, or transferring them to better-performing junkets.” According to people within the industry who spoke with IAG on condition of anonymity, monthly roll minimums can be implemented as flat dollar amounts or in some cases by way of multipliers, whereby junkets are required to roll 20 times the amount of credit issued by the operator. For example, if credit of HK$50 million 題下，中場賭枱的EBITDA為貴賓廳賭枱的一倍，這對任何營連商 而言，都是更吸引的選項。 考慮到這一點，博企首先引入了每月最低轉碼數的要求。 「這做法有助解決的問題是，以往在未有賭枱數目規限前， 部分中介人在一間貴賓廳可消耗10、15或20張賭枱，現在則在 賭枱數目規限下，每張賭枱都變得珍貴。」在賭枱數目規限推出 時，Tash為新濠博亞娛樂有限公司時任博彩營運及市場策略高級 副總裁，他稱：「中場業務需要拿回這些賭枱，因此這要求是打擊 表現不佳的中介人的手段。」 「貴賓廳賭枱的機會成本因賭場而異。從表現不佳的中介人 手中拿回部分或全部賭枱，然後將之轉換為利潤率更高的中場賭 枱，或轉移到表現更好的中介人手中，部分賭場因此獲得更高的 回報。」 業內人士在匿名接受《亞博匯》訪問時稱，每月最低轉碼數要 求可以實際金額計算，或在部分情況下，以倍數方式計算，即中介 人的轉碼數須為營連商提供的信貸額度之20倍。例如，若博企提 供了5000萬港元的信貸額度，中介人的轉碼數一旦少於10億港 元，博企將視之為表現不佳。在這情況下，營連商可能相應地減少 信貸額度、減少賭枱或兩者皆減。 整合及多元化 2013年澳門博彩中介業登峰造極，當彼時博監局向235家博 彩中介人發放了牌照，以便其為澳門的賭場提供服務。自那之後， 該行業加速整合趨勢。 許多規模較小的博彩中介人與更為成熟的中介人相比資源 非常少，並且受到內地反腐運動對經濟的影響——該運動由國家 主席習近平於2012年發起，但直至2014年才影響漸顯——他們要 麼倒閉，要麼被規模大得多的競爭對手吞併。 另一些中介人公司則因沒有遵守嚴格的監管及「反洗黑錢」 的要求而被營運商驅逐。還有一些公司則通過與太陽城這樣的大 公司達成協議而得以倖存，太陽城可能會允許他們以利潤的一部 分用以交換豪華貴賓會內賭枱的使用權。 然而持牌的中介人公司數量持續下降。2015年降至200間以 下，今年1月則降至100間以下，目前為95間。專家預測，未來幾年