Inside Asian Gaming

IAG SEP 2020年9月 亞博匯 50 to a maximum number must be submitted for DICJ approval and, most importantly, that all directors, main employees and anyone holding 5% or more of the company’s capital stock must pass a probity check and be deemed a suitable person. For their part, concessionaires were given primary responsibility for keeping their junket partners in line by supervising their activity to ensure compliance with the legal rules and regulations. It was also up to concessionaires to withhold tax due on commissions or any other remunerations paid to the gaming promoter calculated on GGR originated by the player. The tax rate on these commissions or other remunerations was set at 5% (later altered to 3% but since 2007 back to 5%). The Gaming Promoters’ Regulation (6/2002), published the following year, provided a more detailed description of laws governing gaming promoters, including licensing requirements and circumstances under which junkets and concessionaires could be fined or, at worst, have their licenses revoked. Among its key provisions was that junkets were to be licensed annually, that they were to cover the full cost of probity checks by way of a MOP$100,000 advance deposit, and that the managing director must own at least 10% of the company’s registered share capital. It also required that all shares in a junket company be held by a “natural person” – a measure that effectively excluded licensed junkets from being listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (non-junket operations are another matter). The real game changer for junkets, however, was implementation of the Gaming Credit Law in 2004, which for the first time provided a legal provision for concessionaires and junkets to provide credit to players. Crucially, it also made it clear that gambling debts accrued via such legal issuance of credit were fully enforceable in Macau – a provision which ultimately cemented the long-term relationship between operators and junkets and saw the latter move off the IN FOCUS 而次年發佈的第6/2002號行政法規《訂定從事娛樂場幸運博 彩中介業務的資格及規則》則進一步對博彩中介人的法律規定做 出進一步詳細說明，包括發出博彩中介人准照的程序、承批公司 與博彩中介人的連帶責任，在最壞的情況下可能會被註銷准照。 其中一項關鍵條款是：博彩中介人的准照須每年重新審核，申請 成為博彩中介人之人士須為適當資格審查程序提供10萬元現金 擔保，公司負責人必須至少持有公司10%的股份。 該法亦規定中介人企業須由「自然人」持股，這條款令獲發牌 的中介人企業無法在香港交易所上市（其非博彩業務則是另一回 事）。 然而，真正改變博彩中介人遊戲規則的，是2004年實施的《娛 樂場博彩或投注信貸》法律（博彩信貸法），該法首次對博彩經營 承批公司和博彩中介人如何向玩家提供信貸業務作出規定。 尤為重要的是，該法清楚地表明，通過這種合法信貸而產生 的賭債在澳門是完全可以被強制執行的——這項規定最終鞏固了 博彩營運商和博彩中介人之間的長期合作關係，並使得後者得以 完全離開街頭，走進現今綜合度假村的豪華貴賓廳。 然而，這項條款並未解決來自澳門之外——當然不是內地—— 的玩家的賭債追償問題。但自澳門永利於2013年在一場頗具里程 碑意義的官司中勝訴以來，這方面取得了一些進展。在上述案件 中，香港高等法院對一位香港市民執行了一筆1400萬港元（180萬 美元）的賭債追償。 Green認為，博彩信貸法的實施對澳門博彩業具有革命性意義。 他解釋道：「信貸法確實允許賭場為博彩中介人的信貸提供 定金。」 「須注意的是，即使他們要求博彩中介人向他們存入數量可 觀的現金來支撐自己的風險，但這還是存在一定程度的風險，然 後這些中介人就可以自己利用他們在賭場擁有的信貸及定金，去 招攬那些具更高價值的賭客。」 「這也意味著你的轉碼者轉入室內。他們走出街道的陰影， 進入賭場，成為在字面意義上於賭枱和貴賓廳之間轉碼的人。他 們只需要拿走獲勝的籌碼，放回泥碼，直至這個人履行了他的義 務觸動了定金。」 Green指出，澳門對博彩中介人的監督，較美國或澳洲這些更 為嚴格的博彩司法管轄區所預期的要「寬鬆」一些，但既成事實的 是中介人已經從街道登堂進入綜合度假村，令博彩營運商們更需 關注正在發生的事情。 他解釋稱：「一旦（中介人）與這些運營商簽訂了合同，營運商 們就必須對中介人的運營進行重要監管。」 「標準的博彩中介協議要求他們提供有關『反洗錢』要求的 所有文件。他們必須遵守營運商的指示，尤其是遵守其內部要求， 所以其實是有了一個法律之外的、非正式的監管。但顯然地，確保 中介人合法經營符合賭場營運商的利益。曾經發生過很多中介人 因為不遵守規定而被營運商終止合同的情況。」