Inside Asian Gaming

IAG MAY 2020年5月 亞博匯 69 專欄 for two primary reasons. First, they may be held jointly liable with the junket operator for any wrongdoing that occurs on casino premises. Secondly, all of the gaming concessionaires are publicly traded and listed corporations; there is considerable reputational, governance and legal risk involved for them in contracting junket operators. The fact that an operator is licensed does not absolve them of responsibility for oversight of their compliance with both the general law, and with the terms of their contracts. A further factor which supported this approach is that three of the concessionaires are associated with Nevada casino licensees. Nevada Revised Statute 463 regulates gaming and industry participants in accordance with pronouncement of the State’s public policy parameters for the industry. The very first of those is the following: “The gaming industry is vitally important to the economy of the State and the general welfare of the inhabitants.” Those same words could easily have prefaced Law 16/2001. Unlike Macau, with which it shares a strong dependence on gaming as a source of employment and government tax revenue, Nevada seeks to exert regulatory authority over its licensees and their affiliates when they involve themselves in foreign gaming operations. NRS 463.720 details a number of practices which are prohibited when a licensee (or affiliate under its control) is involved in foreign gaming operations. These include failing to conduct those operations in accordance with the standards of honesty and integrity required for gaming inNevada, or entering into an association considered “unsuitable” for a Nevada licensee because it is contrary to the public policy of Nevada concerning gaming. What is remarkable, given the periodic yelps of outrage concerning Macau’s regulation of junkets, is that Nevada has generally accepted that a jurisdiction can still function to a level it considers acceptable, and suitable for participation by its licensees, even if it does not as rigidly proscribe or 且在與中介營運商簽署協議時需要顧及自己在聲譽管理及法律 上可能面對的風險。雖然中介人取得了牌照，但這亦沒有免除承 批人們監督中介人遵守一般法律及其合約條款的責任。 另外，一個支持這個論點的因素，就是我們三個賭牌承批人 在內華達州的賭場牌照。內華達的Revised Statute 463法律，是 根據該州對博彩業公共政策規範的宣告來監管該行業及企業人 士。當中的第一項指出：「博彩業對於本州的經濟以及居民的一般 福祉尤其重要。」這段文字很大程度上亦可作為澳門16/2001法 律的前言。 內華達州與非常依賴博彩業作為主要職位及政府稅收來源 的澳門有所不同，前者同時監管著賭牌持有人及其附屬機構在海 外的博彩運作。NRS 463.720就詳細地列出了一系列持牌人(或其 控制的附屬機構)在牽涉海外博彩活動時被禁止的行為，這些包 括在海外營運時不遵循內華達關於博彩的誠信準則及廉潔要求， 或者與被內華達州判斷為不適合作為賭牌持有人的個體合作，因 為這違背了內華達州關於博彩的政策。 在一個三不五時都出現針對澳門中介監管的不滿之聲的情 況下，內華達州的做法亦有讓人出奇之處：該州基本上認為一個 司法管轄區即使沒有像該州一樣強硬地制止或懲罰犯罪集團或 行為的情況下，依然可以在一個可接受的水平上運作，並且適合 讓其賭牌持有人參與其中。那些被認為每一個司法管轄區都應該 追求的規範準則，在全球兩大博彩司法管轄區中都沒有被採納。 這其實顯示出幾樣事情。首先，這世上其實並不存在一套必 須跟從的監管標準。如果有的話，每個司法管轄區都已經在採納 或希望採納。第二，澳門和內華達州這兩個司法管轄區都沒有一 個龐大而且多元的經濟基礎。它們必須從實際角度出發，去決定 主要行業應該走上一條擴張還是進步的路向。這並不代表要放棄 標準，而是應該與他們監管的對象合作，從而逐漸把標準提升。澳 門最近的反洗黑錢相互評估(AML Mutual Evaluation)正正就顯 示出這種做法所蘊含的智慧。 當6/2002行政法規生效時，澳門的中介企業對於所有賭場的 博彩總收入貢獻超過70%。 如果當時的監管過於嚴格，並且在適合度方面有一套很高的 基準的話，特區可能會因此失陷，而中國就需要面對一個未必能