Inside Asian Gaming

IAG MAY 2020年5月 亞博匯 66 COLUMNISTS to shore up the finances of the nascent administration. Article 105 specifically required the SAR to adopt policies which would see revenues match or exceed public expenditure. On the plus side of the ledger was Macau’s gaming industry. In 1999, tax on the gross gaming revenue of the monopoly operator, STDM, contributed 47% of all government revenue. STDM employed directly more than 10,000 people, or about 5% of the workforce at the time. This number does not include junket operators’ staff and agents, who were generating more than 60% of STDM’s revenue through their VIP operations. It is likely they were far more numerous than the direct employees of STDM. In a report written for the US Congress in August 1999, the Congressional Research Service presciently observed that, “In dealing with Macau after December 20, 1999, China will face the dilemma of how to preserve the profitability of the gambling industry, in order to retain this significant source of revenue.” The PRC was unlikely to provide a mechanism for the lawful recovery of gaming debts incurred by its residents, given the propensity for such recourse to contribute to social disharmony. Moreover, were it to do so, it would potentially make junket operators, their employees and agents redundant. The perils associated with that course were demonstrated during the open warfare that had broken out in 1997 between the 14K and Sui Fong triads over control of VIP rooms in STDM’s casinos. Tourist arrivals, the source of much of the economy’s revenue, fell almost 20% between 1996 and 1998. It was in the interests of both the PRC and the Ho administration, and the people of Macau, that the potential of the gaming industry to be a driver of growth be stimulated. Arthur Andersen was appointed in August 2000 to 另外，一旦這樣做的話，將有可能令到中介營運商及其員工和代 表們變得多餘。如此做法可能會帶來的危險，亦已於1997年14k 及水房兩派黑幫的公開火拼中表露無遺。當時兩幫人都在爭奪澳 娛旗下貴賓廳的控制權。在1996至1998年間，旅客到訪數字下跌 接近20%，而旅客就是當時大部分經濟收入的來源。因此，為中國 和何厚鏵的管治團隊，以及為澳門的市民而言，能夠引出博彩業 作為增長動力的潛能，都是有所裨益的。 Arthur Andersen在2000年8月在如何開放賭業一事上獲特 區政府委任提供諮詢服務。從一開始最需要提出的，明顯就是澳 門需要採納一套行業的監管制度。這套制度需要滿足潛在牌照競 投人或承批人的最低預期，而承批制度本身為大部分的競投者而 言都是一種陌生的概念。 2001年10月，取代多條法規的16/2001博彩法津被採納，緊 隨其後的是6/2002行政法規，規範對於中介營運商及其牌照的 監管。該法規要到2004才真正得到落實，這是希望給予中介經營 者時間去作籌備，以符合法規的要求。 法規當中亦特別要求中介牌照必須由一位自然人或者由自 然人獨資擁有的公司持有。這是為了加強透明度，並且防止中介 企業的股權出現在公眾間流傳的情況。 中介的發牌是根據其是否適合而定，這亦只是與澳門賭牌承 批人進行業務的最低門檻。一旦取得牌照，中介人必須與其計劃 合作的每位承批人達成書面合同。這些合同隨時間的轉移亦有所 改變，這是由於中介在法律要求下所承擔的責任亦日益增加，當 中包括反洗黑錢及放債方面的法律等。 另外，賭牌承批人所承擔的義務亦有所增加，特別是在符合 最低內部控制標準(Minimum Internal Control Requirements) 方面。雖然中介經營者獲得了牌照，但這並不表示監管機構保證 這些營運者都切合需求，這是應該由每一位賭牌承批人通過他們 自己的查問從而得知的。對於賭牌承批人而言，能夠確認有合約 關係的中介營運商符合法律要求是十分重要的。這有兩大原因： 第一，如果中介營運商在賭場設施範圍內有任何過錯，賭牌承批 人亦可能需要一同負上責任；第二，賭牌承批人都是上市公司，並